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Abstract
A secure set S in a graph is defined as a set of vertices such that for any X ⊆ S the majority
of vertices in the neighborhood of X belongs to S. It is known that deciding whether a set S is
secure in a graph is co-NP-complete. However, it is still open how this result contributes to the
actual complexity of deciding whether for a given graph G and integer k, a non-empty secure
set for G of size at most k exists. In this work, we pinpoint the complexity of this problem
by showing that it is ΣP2 -complete. Furthermore, the problem has so far not been subject to a
parameterized complexity analysis that considers structural parameters. In the present work, we
prove that the problem is W[1]-hard when parameterized by treewidth. This is surprising since
the problem is known to be FPT when parameterized by solution size and “subset problems”
that satisfy this property usually tend to be FPT for bounded treewidth as well. Finally, we give
an upper bound by showing membership in XP, and we provide a positive result in the form of
an FPT algorithm for checking whether a given set is secure on graphs of bounded treewidth.
1998 ACM Subject Classification F.2.2 Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems
Keywords and phrases secure set, complexity analysis, parameterized algorithms
1 Introduction
The objective of many problems that can be modeled as graphs is finding a group of vertices
that together satisfy some property. In this respect, one of the concepts that has been quite
extensively studied [31] is the notion of a defensive alliance [20], which is a set of vertices
such that for each element v at least half of its neighbors are also in the alliance. The name
“defensive alliance” stems from the intuition that the neighbors of such an element v that are
also in the alliance can help out in case v is attacked by its other neighbors. Notions like
this can be applied to finding groups of nations, companies or individuals that depend on
each other, but also to more abstract situations like finding groups of websites that form
communities [18].
In this work, we are looking at a natural generalization of defensive alliances called secure
sets, which have been introduced by Brigham et al. [11]. While defensive alliances make sure
that each element of an alliance can defend itself against attacks from its neighbors, they do
not account for attacks on multiple vertices at the same time. To this end, we can employ a
stronger concept: A secure set of a graph G is a subset S of the vertices of G such that for
each X ⊆ S, the number of vertices in N [X] ∩ S is not less than the number of vertices in
N [X] \ S. Here N [X] denotes the closed neighborhood of X in G, i.e., X together with all
vertices adjacent to X. The Secure Set problem can now be stated as follows: Given a
graph G and an integer k, does there exists a secure set S of G such that 1 ≤ |S| ≤ k?
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2 Complexity of Secure Sets
It is known that deciding whether a given set S is secure in a graph is co-NP-complete [21],
so it would not be surprising if finding (non-trivial) secure sets is also a very hard problem.
Unfortunately, the exact complexity of this problem has so far remained unresolved. This is
an unsatisfactory state of affairs because it leaves the possibility open that existing approaches
for solving the problem (e.g., [1]) are suboptimal in that they employ unnecessarily powerful
programming techniques. Hence we require a precise complexity-theoretic classification of
the problem.
Due to its high complexity, it makes sense to look at the parameterized complexity [16, 19,
26, 13] of the problem and to study if Secure Set becomes tractable under the assumption
that certain parameters of the problem instances are small. For some parameters, this may
be a reasonable assumption in practice. For instance, it has been shown that Secure Set
can be solved in linear time if the solution size is bounded by a constant [17]. If we are only
interested in small secure sets, the resulting algorithm is therefore a good choice.
However, we often cannot make the assumption that the solutions are small. In such
cases, it is a common strategy to consider structural parameters instead, which measure in
a certain way how complex the graph underlying a problem instance is. One of the most
studied structural parameters is treewidth [27, 5, 7], which indicates how close a graph is
to being a tree. Treewidth is an attractive parameter because many hard problems become
tractable on instances of bounded treewidth, and in several practical applications it has been
observed that the considered problem instances exhibit small treewidth [5, 30, 24]. In [22]
it has been shown that a certain variant of Secure Set becomes easy on trees, but the
complexity of Secure Set parameterized by treewidth is listed as an open problem in that
work and has so far remained unresolved.
The first main contribution of our paper is to show that Secure Set is ΣP2 -complete.
Unlike the existing co-NP-hardness proof [21], which uses a (quite involved) reduction from
Dominating Set, we base our proof on a reduction from a problem in the area of logic. To
be specific, we first show that the canonical ΣP2 -complete problem Qsat2 can be reduced
to a variant of Secure Set, where vertices can be forced to be in or out of every solution,
and pairs of vertices can be specified to indicate that every solution must contain exactly
one element of each such pair. In order to prove the desired complexity result, we then
successively reduce this variant to the standard Secure Set problem. At the same time, we
show ΣP2 -completeness for the exact variants of these problems, where we are interested in
secure sets exactly of a certain size.
Membership in the class ΣP2 is rather obvious; in fact, [1] presents a polynomial-time
reduction to Answer Set Programming [10] and thus shows this result implicitly. Together
with our corresponding hardness result, it follows that Secure Set is ΣP2 -complete, and it
turns out that all the problem variants we consider in this paper are ΣP2 -complete.
We thus complete the picture of the precise complexity of the Secure Set problem,
and we also provide completeness results for variants of the problem that have already been
proposed [22] but for which no complexity analysis has been performed so far. Our results
underline that Secure Set is among the few rather natural problems in graph theory that
are complete for the second layer of the polynomial hierarchy (like, e.g., Clique Coloring
[25] or 2-Coloring Extension [28]). Moreover, ΣP2 -hardness of Secure Set indicates that
an efficient reduction to the Sat problem is not possible (unless the polynomial hierarchy
collapses).
The second main contribution of our paper is a parameterized complexity analysis of
Secure Set with treewidth as the parameter. We show that this problem is hard for the
class W[1], which rules out a fixed-parameter tractable algorithm under commonly held
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complexity-theoretic assumptions. This result is rather surprising for two reasons: First, the
problem is tractable on trees [22] and quite often problems that become easy on trees turn
out to become easy on graphs of bounded treewidth.1 Second, this makes Secure Set one
of the very few “subset problems” that are fixed-parameter tractable w.r.t. solution size but
not w.r.t. treewidth. Problems with this kind of behavior are rather rare, as observed by
Dom et al. [15].
Beside this parameterized hardness result, we also give an upper bound by showing that
Secure Set is in the class XP, which means that it can be solved in polynomial time on
instances of bounded treewidth. We do so by providing an algorithm where the degree of the
polynomial depends on the treewidth.
Finally, we present a positive result for the co-NP-complete problem of checking whether
a given set of vertices is secure in a graph: We provide an algorithm that solves the problem
in linear time for graphs of bounded treewidth.
This paper is organized as follows: We first provide the necessary background in Section 2.
Then we analyze the complexity of Secure Set in Section 3, where we show that this problem,
along with several variants, is ΣP2 -complete. In Section 4, we consider the parameterized
complexity of Secure Set where treewidth is our parameter of interest. Section 5 concludes
the paper with a discussion.
The present work extends a conference paper [4], which did not contain any results about
the parameterized complexity of the considered problems. Beside the new results in Section 4,
we also slightly modified some of the reductions that prove ΣP2 -hardness so that they preserve
bounded treewidth, which allows us to reuse them for our parameterized hardness proofs.
We also added a reduction (which eliminates necessary vertices), which made one of the
reductions (from the exact variant of the problem to the non-exact variant) from the previous
paper redundant.
2 Background
All graphs are undirected and simple unless stated otherwise. We denote the set of vertices
and edges of a graph G by V (G) and E(G), respectively. We denote an undirected edge
between vertices u and v as (u, v) or equivalently (v, u). It will be clear from the context
whether an edge (u, v) is directed or undirected. Given a graph G, the open neighborhood
of a vertex v ∈ V (G), denoted by NG(v), is the set of all vertices adjacent to v, and
NG[v] = NG(v) ∪ {v} is called the closed neighborhood of v. Let S ⊆ V (G). We abuse
notation by writing NG(S) and NG[S] to denote
⋃
v∈S NG(v) and
⋃
v∈S NG[v], respectively.
If it is clear from the context which graph is meant, we write N(·) and N [·] instead of NG(·)
and NG[·], respectively.
I Definition 1. Given a graph G, a set S ⊆ V (G) is secure in G if for each X ⊆ S it holds
that |N [X] ∩ S| ≥ |N [X] \ S|.
We often write “S is secure” instead of “S is secure in G” if it is clear from the context which
graph is meant. By definition, the empty set is secure in any graph. Thus, in the following
decision problems we ask for secure sets of size at least 1. The following is our main problem:
1 To be precise, [22] shows that a slight variant of Secure Set is tractable on trees, since Secure Set
on trees is trivial. Our results, however, also imply W[1]-hardness for this particular variant.
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Figure 1 A graph with a minimum non-empty secure set indicated by circled vertices
Secure Set
Input: A graph G and an integer k with 1 ≤ k ≤ |V (G)|
Question: Does there exist a set S ⊆ V (G) with 1 ≤ |S| ≤ k that is secure?
Figure 1 shows a graph together with a minimum non-empty secure set S = {a, b, c}. Observe
that for any X ⊆ S the condition |N [X] ∩ S| ≥ |N [X] \ S| is satisfied.
Note that the well-known Defensive Alliance problem is a special case of Secure Set
where only those subsets X of S are considered that have size 1. For example, in Figure 1,
the set S′ = {a, b} is a defensive alliance as |N [v] ∩ S′| ≥ |N [v] \ S′| holds for each v ∈ S′,
but S′ is not a secure set, since for X ′ = S′ it holds that |N [X ′] ∩ S′| < |N [X ′] \ S′|.
We now define three variants of the Secure Set problem that we require in our proofs.
Secure SetF generalizes the Secure Set problem by designating some “forbidden” vertices
that may never be in any solution. This variant can be formalized as follows:
Secure SetF
Input: A graph G, an integer k and a set V ⊆ V (G)
Question: Does there exist a set S ⊆ V (G) \ V with 1 ≤ |S| ≤ k that is secure?
Secure SetFN is a further generalization that, in addition, allows “necessary” vertices to be
specified that must occur in every solution.
Secure SetFN
Input: A graph G, an integer k, a set V ⊆ V (G) and a set V4 ⊆ V (G)
Question: Does there exist a set S ⊆ V (G) \ V with V4 ⊆ S and 1 ≤ |S| ≤ k that is
secure?
Finally, we introduce the generalization Secure SetFNC. Here we may state pairs of
“complementary” vertices where each solution must contain exactly one element of every such
pair.
Secure SetFNC
Input: A graph G, an integer k, a set V ⊆ V (G), a set V4 ⊆ V (G) and a set
C ⊆ V (G)2
Question: Does there exist a set S ⊆ V (G) \ V with V4 ⊆ S and 1 ≤ |S| ≤ k that is
secure and, for each pair (a, b) ∈ C, contains either a or b?
For our results on structural parameters, we need a way to represent the structure of a
Secure SetFNC instance by a graph that augments G with the information in C:
I Definition 2. Let I be a Secure SetFNC instance, let G be the graph in I and let C the
set of complementary vertex pairs in I. By the primal graph of I we mean the graph G′ with
V (G′) = V (G) and E(G′) = E(G) ∪ C.
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Figure 2 Illustration of forbidden, necessary and complementary vertices
While the Secure Set problem asks for secure sets of size at most k, we also consider the
Exact Secure Set problem that concerns secure sets of size exactly k. Note that a secure
set may become insecure by adding or removing elements, so this is a non-trivial problem
variant. Analogously, we also define exact versions of the three generalizations of Secure
Set presented above.
When the task is not to find secure sets but to verify whether a given set is secure, the
following problem is of interest:
Secure Set Verification
Input: A graph G and a set S ⊆ V (G)
Question: Is S secure?
This problem is known to be co-NP-complete [21].
In this paper’s figures, we often indicate necessary vertices by means of a triangular
node shape, and forbidden vertices by means of either a square node shape or a superscript
square in the node name. If two vertices are complementary, we often express this in the
figures by putting a 6= sign between them. For example, in Figure 2, the vertices b and c are
complementary and occur in no solution together; also the vertices b and e are complementary.
Note, however, that by putting a 6= sign between two vertices we do not mean to express that
there is an edge between them. For instance, there is no edge between b and c, but there is an
edge between b and e, which is explicitly drawn. The vertex a and the “anonymous” vertex
adjacent to c are necessary and occur in every solution; d and the “anonymous” vertex
adjacent to e are forbidden and occur in no solution. In this figure, the unique minimum
non-empty secure set satisfying the conditions of forbidden, necessary and complementary
vertices consists of a, b and the “anonymous” necessary vertex adjacent to c.
The following terminology will be helpful: We often use the terms attackers and defenders
of a subset X of a secure set candidate S. By these we mean the sets N [X] \ S and
N [X]∩ S, respectively. To show that a subset X of a secure set candidate S is not a witness
to S being insecure, we sometimes employ the notion of a defense of X w.r.t. S, which
assigns to each attacker a dedicated defender: If we are able to find an injective mapping
µ : N [X] \ S → N [X] ∩ S, then obviously |N [X] \ S| ≤ |N [X] ∩ S|, and we call µ a defense
of X w.r.t. S. Given such a defense µ, we say that a defender d repels an attack on X by an
attacker a whenever µ(a) = d. Consequentially, when we say that a set of defenders D can
repel attacks on X from a set of attackers A, we mean that there is a defense that assigns to
each element of A a dedicated defender in D.
To warm up, we make some easy observations that we will use in our proofs. First, for
every set R consisting of a majority of neighbors of a vertex v, whenever v is in a secure set,
also some element of R must be in it:
I Observation 3. Let S be a secure set in a graph, let v ∈ S and let R ⊆ N(v). If
|R| > 12N [v], then S contains an element of R.
Proof. Suppose that |R| > 12 |N [v]| and S contains no element of R. Since all elements of R
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attack v, |N [v] \ S| > 12 |N [v]|. Hence 2|N [v] \ S| > |N [v]| = |N [v] ∩ S|+ |N [v] \ S|, and we
obtain the contradiction |N [v] \ S| > |N [v] ∩ S|. J
Next, if one half of the neighbors of an element v of a secure set attacks v, then the other
half of the neighbors must be in the secure set:
I Observation 4. Let S be a secure set in a graph, let v ∈ S and let N(v) be partitioned
into two equal-sized sets A,D. If A ∩ S = ∅, then D ⊆ S.
Proof. Since N(v) is partitioned into A and D such that A∩S = ∅, we get N(v)∩S = D∩S.
If some element of D is not in S, then D ∩ S ⊂ D and A ⊂ N [v] \ S. By |D| = |A|, we get
|D ∩ S|+ 2 ≤ |N [v] \ S|. From |N [v] ∩ S| = 1 + |N(v) ∩ S| = 1 + |D ∩ S| we now obtain the
contradiction |N [v] ∩ S| < |N [v] \ S|. J
In particular, if half of the neighbors of v are forbidden, then v can only be in a given secure
set if all non-forbidden neighbors are also in the secure set.
Finally, we recapitulate some background from complexity theory. The class ΣP2 is the
class of problems that are solvable in polynomial time by a nondeterministic Turing machine
that has access to an NP oracle. The canonical problem complete for this class is Qsat2,
which asks, given a formula ∃x1 . . . ∃xnx∀y1 . . . ∀ynyψ, where ψ is a propositional 3-DNF
formula, whether there is a truth assignment to the xi variables such that for all truth
assignments to the yi variables ψ evaluates to true.
In parameterized complexity theory [16, 19, 26, 13], we study problems that consist not
only of an input and a question, but also of some parameter of the input that is represented
as an integer. A problem is in the class FPT (“fixed-parameter tractable”) if it can be solved
in time f(k) · nc, where n is the input size, k is the parameter, f is a computable function
that only depends on k, and c is a constant that does not depend on k or n. We call such
an algorithm an FPT algorithm, and we call it fixed-parameter linear if c = 1. Similarly, a
problem is in the class XP (“slice-wise polynomial”) if it can be solved in time f(k) · ng(k),
where f and g are computable functions. Note that here the degree of the polynomial may
depend on k, so such algorithms are generally slower than FPT algorithms. For the class
W[1] it holds that FPT ⊆W[1] ⊆ XP, and it is commonly believed that the inclusions are
proper, i.e., W[1]-hard problems do not admit FPT algorithms. W[1]-hardness of a problem
can be shown using parameterized reductions, which are reductions that run in FPT time
and produce an equivalent instance whose parameter is bounded by a function of the original
parameter.
For problems whose input can be represented as a graph, one important parameter is
treewidth, which is a structural parameter that, roughly speaking, measures the “tree-likeness”
of a graph. It is defined by means of tree decompositions, originally introduced in [27]. The
intuition behind tree decompositions is to obtain a tree from a (potentially cyclic) graph by
subsuming multiple vertices under one node and thereby isolating the parts responsible for
cyclicity.
I Definition 5. A tree decomposition of a graph G is a pair T = (T, χ) where T is a (rooted)
tree and χ : V (T )→ 2V (G) assigns to each node of T a set of vertices of G (called the node’s
bag), such that the following conditions are met:
1. For every vertex v ∈ V (G), there is a node t ∈ V (T ) such that v ∈ χ(t).
2. For every edge (u, v) ∈ E(G), there is a node t ∈ V (T ) such that {u, v} ⊆ χ(t).
3. For every v ∈ V (G), the subtree of T induced by {t ∈ V (T ) | v ∈ χ(t)} is connected.
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G:
a
b
c
d T : ∅ {a}
tTa
{a, c}
tTc {a, c} {a, b, c}
tTb
{a, b} {a} ∅
{a, c} {a, c, d}
tTd
{c, d} {d} ∅
Figure 3 A graph G and a nice tree decomposition T of G rooted at the leftmost node
We call maxt∈V (T )|χ(t)| − 1 the width of T . The treewidth of a graph is the minimum width
over all its tree decompositions.
In general, constructing an optimal tree decomposition (i.e., a tree decomposition with
minimum width) is intractable [2]. However, the problem is solvable in linear time on graphs
of bounded treewidth (specifically in time wO(w3) · n, where w is the treewidth) [6] and there
are also heuristics that offer good performance in practice [14, 8].
In this paper we will consider so-called nice tree decompositions:
I Definition 6. A tree decomposition T = (T, χ) is nice if each node t ∈ V (T ) is of one of
the following types:
1. Leaf node: The node t has no child nodes.
2. Introduce node: The node t has exactly one child node t′ such that χ(t) \ χ(t′) consists
of exactly one element.
3. Forget node: The node t has exactly one child node t′ such that χ(t′) \ χ(t) consists of
exactly one element.
4. Join node: The node t has exactly two child nodes t1 and t2 with χ(t) = χ(t1) = χ(t2).
Additionally, the bags of the root and the leaves of T are empty.
A tree decomposition of width w for a graph with n vertices can be transformed into a nice
one of width w with O(wn) nodes in fixed-parameter linear time [23].
For any tree decomposition T and an element v of some bag in T , we use the notation tTv
to denote the unique “topmost node” whose bag contains v (i.e., tTv does not have a parent
whose bag contains v). Figure 3 depicts a graph and a nice tree decomposition, where we
also illustrate the tTv notation.
When we speak of the treewidth of an instance of Secure Set, Secure SetF, Secure
SetFN, Exact Secure Set, Exact Secure SetF or Exact Secure SetFN, we mean
the treewidth of the graph in the instance. For an instance of Secure SetFNC or Exact
Secure SetFNC, we mean the treewidth of the primal graph.
3 Complexity of the Secure Set Problem
This section is devoted to proving the following theorem:
I Theorem 7. The following problems are all ΣP2 -complete: Secure Set, Exact Secure
Set, Secure SetF, Exact Secure SetF, Secure SetFN, Exact Secure SetFN,
Secure SetFNC and Exact Secure SetFNC.
We prove this by providing a chain of polynomial reductions from Qsat2 to the problems
under consideration.
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t1

t2

t3

x1
6=
x1
x2
6=
x2
x3
6=
x3
d1 d

2
t1
t2
t3
t

6= t′1
6= t′2
6= t′3
6=
t1
6=
t2
6=
t3
6=
t′1
6=
t′2
6=
t′3
y1
y1
y2
y2
(nt)
(nt + 1)
(nt − 1)
Figure 4 Graph corresponding to the Qsat2 formula ∃x1∃x2∃x3 ∀y1∀y2
(
(¬x1 ∧ x2 ∧ y1)∨ (x3 ∧
¬y1 ∧ y2) ∨ (x3 ∧ ¬y1 ∧ ¬y2)
)
. To avoid clutter, we omit labels for the vertices from Y4, Y ′4, Y,
T4, T ′ and T ′, and we draw some edges in a dashed style.
3.1 Hardness of Secure Set With Forbidden, Necessary And
Complementary Vertices
I Lemma 8. Secure SetFNC and Exact Secure SetFNC are ΣP2 -hard.
Proof. We reduce fromQsat2 to Secure SetFNC. This also proves ΣP2 -hardness for the exact
variant because our reduction makes sure that all solutions of the Secure SetFNC instance
have the same size. We are given a quantified Boolean formula ϕ = ∃x1 . . . ∃xnx∀y1 . . . ∀ynyψ,
where ψ is in 3-DNF and contains nt terms. We assume that no term contains both a variable
and its complement (since such a term can never be satisfied) and that each term contains
at least one universally quantified variable (since ϕ is trivially true otherwise).
We construct an instance (G, k, V4, V, C) of Secure SetFNC in the following. For an
illustration, see Figure 4. We define a graph G by choosing the union of the following sets as
V (G):
X = {x1, . . . , xnx} X = {x1, . . . , xnx}
Y = {y1, . . . , yny} Y = {y1, . . . , yny}
Y4 = {y4i,j , yi,j4 | 1 ≤ i ≤ ny, 1 ≤ j ≤ nt} Y ′4 = {y4j | 1 ≤ j ≤ nt − 1}
Y = {yi,j | 1 ≤ i ≤ ny, 1 ≤ j ≤ nt + 1} H = {d1 , d2 , t}
T = {t1, . . . , tnt} T = {t1, . . . , tnt}
T = {t1, . . . , tnt} T4 = {t14, . . . , tnt4}
T ′ = {t′1, . . . , t′nt} T ′ = {t′1, . . . , t′nt}
T ′ = {t′1 , . . . , t′nt} T ′ = {t′1

, . . . , t′nt
}
Next we define the set of edges. In the following, whenever we sloppily speak of a literal in
the context of the graph G, we mean the vertex corresponding to that literal (i.e., some xi,
xi, yi or yi), and we proceed similarly for terms. Furthermore, when we are dealing with a
(vertex corresponding to a) literal l, then l shall denote the (vertex corresponding to the)
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complement of l. For any term ti, let LX(ti) and LY (ti) denote the set of existentially and
universally quantified literals, respectively, in ti.
E(G) =
{
(ti, t
), (ti, ti
4), (t′i, t′i ), (t′i, t′i
) | ti ∈ T
}
∪ (T ′ × (Y ∪ Y ))
∪
{
(l, ti
), (l, ti) | ti ∈ T, l ∈ LX(ti)
}
∪
{
(l, t′i) | ti ∈ T, l ∈ LY (ti)
}
∪
{
(d1 , ti) | ti ∈ T, |LX(ti)| ≤ 1
}
∪
{
(d2 , ti) | ti ∈ T, LX(ti) = ∅
}
∪
{
(yi, y4i,j), (yi, yi,j4) | 1 ≤ i ≤ ny, 1 ≤ j ≤ nt
}
∪
{
(yi, yi,j), (yi, yi,j) | yi,j ∈ Y
}
∪ (Y ′4 × (Y ∪ Y ))
Finally, we define
V4 = Y ∪ Y ∪ Y4 ∪ Y ′4 ∪ T4, V = Y ∪ T ∪ T ′ ∪ T ′ ∪H,
C = {(xi, xi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ nx} ∪ {(ti, ti), (ti, t′i), (t′i, t′i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ nt},
and k = |V4|+ nx + 2nt.
The following observations are crucial: Elements of X ∪X are only adjacent to vertices
from T (which are forbidden) and T . For any i, each element of X ∪ X is adjacent to
ti
 ∈ T iff it is adjacent to ti ∈ T . Furthermore, for any i, j, if xi or xi is adjacent to tj ,
then setting the variable xi to true or false, respectively, falsifies the term tj . Finally, for
any i, j, if yi or yi is adjacent to t′j , then setting the variable yi to true or false, respectively,
falsifies the term tj .
The intuition is that the complementary pairs (xi, xi) guess a truth assignment to the
existentially quantified variables. We now need to check if such a truth assignment has the
property that the formula ψ is true for all extensions of this assignment to the universally
quantified variables. Trying out all these extensions amounts to going through all subsets of
a solution candidate and comparing the numbers of attackers and defenders.
To illustrate, let S be a solution candidate (i.e., a set of vertices) and suppose S satisfies
the conditions on forbidden, necessary and complementary vertices. We denote the truth
assignment to x1, . . . , xnx encoded in S by IS . Moreover, let R be a subset of S containing
either yj or yj for each universally quantified variable yj . We denote the extension of IS to
y1, . . . , yny encoded in R by IS,R. For any term ti that is falsified already by IS , the vertex
t′i attacks all vertices yj and yj . At the same time, for any term ti that is not falsified by IS ,
the vertex t′i attacks yj or yj if setting the variable yj to true or false, respectively, falsifies ti.
Hence, the number of attacks from vertices of the form t′i or t′i on R is exactly the number of
terms that are falsified by IS,R. With the help of the vertices in Y ′4, we can afford up to
nt − 1 falsified terms, but if we falsify all nt terms, then R is a witness that S is not secure.
The Secure SetFNC instance (G, k, V4, V, C) can be constructed in time polynomial in
the size of ϕ. We claim that ϕ is true iff (G, k, V4, V, C) is a positive instance of Secure
SetFNC.
“Only if” direction. If ϕ is true, then there is an assignment I to x1, . . . , xnx such that, for all
assignments extending I to y1, . . . , yny , some term in ψ is satisfied. We define a set
S = V4 ∪ {xi ∈ X | I(xi) = true} ∪ {xi ∈ X | I(xi) = false}
∪ {ti ∈ T , t′i ∈ T ′ | there is some l ∈ LX(ti) such that I 6|= l}
∪ {ti ∈ T, t′i ∈ T ′ | for all l ∈ LX(ti) it holds that I |= l}.
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We observe that |S| = k, V ∩S = ∅, V4 ⊆ S, and that for any (a, b) ∈ C it holds that a ∈ S
iff b /∈ S. By construction, whenever some element of X ∪X is in S, then all its neighbors in
T are in S; and whenever some ti is in S, then some neighbor of ti in X ∪X is in S.
We claim that S is a secure set in G. Let R be an arbitrary subset of S. We show that R
has at least as many defenders as attackers by constructing a defense, which assigns to each
attacker of R a dedicated defender in N [R] ∩ S. We distinguish cases regarding the origins
of the attacks on R.
We repel each attacker ti
 ∈ T using ti. Since ti attacks R, R must contain some
element of X ∪X that is adjacent to ti and thus also to ti, so ti ∈ N [R] ∩ S.
Each attacker from X ∪ X ∪ {d1 , d2 } is adjacent to some ti ∈ T ∩ R. We repel that
attacker using ti
4, which is adjacent to ti. Note that it cannot be the case that ti
is attacked by more than one vertex in X ∪ X ∪ {d1 , d2 } because ti has exactly two
neighbors from that set and would not be in S if neither of these neighbors was in S.
If t attacks R, then it attacks at least one element of T ∩R, which is adjacent to some
element of X ∪X that is also in S. We repel t using any such element of X ∪X.
Any attack from some ti ∈ T on R must be on ti4. Since ti /∈ S, ti4 is not consumed for
repelling an attack on ti, so we repel ti with ti
4.
If some t′i ∈ T ′ attacks R (by attacking t′i), we repel t′i with t′i.
Analogously, we repel each attacker t′i
 ∈ T ′ with t′i.
If, for some i with 1 ≤ i ≤ ny, the vertices yi,j for 1 ≤ j ≤ nt + 1 attack R, then we
distinguish the following cases: If yi is in R, then the adjacent vertices y4i,j for 1 ≤ j ≤ nt
are in the neighborhood of R, too. We then repel each yi,j with y
4
i,j for 1 ≤ j ≤ nt, and
we repel yi,nt+1 with yi. Otherwise, yi is in R, and we proceed symmetrically using yi,j
4
and yi as dedicated defenders.
In order to account for attacks from T ′ ∪ T ′ on R, we distinguish two cases.
If, for some i with 1 ≤ i ≤ ny, both yi and yi are in R, then, in the step before, we
have repelled each yi,j with the respective y
4
i,j or yi, but all yi,j4 are still free. These
vertices can repel all attacks from T ′ ∪ T ′, as there are at most nt such attacks.
Otherwise we show that there are at most nt− 1 attacks from T ′ ∪T ′, and they can be
repelled using Y ′4. Consider the (partial) assignment J that assigns the same values
to the variables x1, . . . , xnx as the assignment I above, and, for any variable yi, sets yi
to true or false if R contains the vertex yi or yi, respectively. By assumption we know
that our assignment to x1, . . . , xnx is such that for all assignments to y1, . . . , yny some
term ti in ψ is true. In particular, it must therefore hold that J falsifies no existentially
quantified literal in ti. Then, by construction of S, the vertex t′i is not in S. We also
know that J falsifies no universally quantified literal in ti. But then the vertices from
Y ∪ Y adjacent to the vertex t′i are not in R due to our construction of J , so t′i does
not attack any vertex in R. From this it follows that there are at most nt − 1 attacks
from T ′ ∪ T ′ on R. We can repel all these attacks using the vertices y41 , . . . , y4nt−1.
This allows us to conclude |N [R] ∩ S| ≥ |N [R] \ S|. Therefore S is secure.
“If” direction. Suppose S is a secure set in G satisfying the conditions regarding forbidden,
necessary and complementary vertices. First observe that |S| = k because the complementary
vertex pairs make sure that S contains exactly half of V (G) \ (V4 ∪ V).
If S contains some l ∈ X ∪X, then N(l) ∩ T ⊆ S by Observation 4. If S contains some
ti ∈ T , then ti must be adjacent to some element of X ∪X that is also in S by Observation 3.
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We construct an interpretation I on the variables x1, . . . , xnx that sets exactly those xi
to true where the corresponding vertex xi is in S, and we claim that for each extension of I
to the universally quantified variables there is a satisfied term in ψ. To see this, suppose
to the contrary that some assignment J to all variables extends I but falsifies all terms in
ψ. Then we define a set R consisting of all vertices yi such that J(yi) = true, all vertices yi
such that J(yi) = false, and all vertices in (T ′ ∪ T ′)∩ S that are adjacent to these vertices yi
or yi. We show that this contradicts S being secure: Clearly, R is a subset of S and has |R|
defenders due to itself, nt − 1 defenders due to Y ′4, and ny · nt defenders due to N(R) ∩ Y4.
This amounts to |N [R] ∩ S| = |R|+ nt − 1 + ny · nt. On the other hand, there are nt attacks
on R from T ′ ∪ T ′. This is because for any term ti in ψ one of the following cases applies:
The term ti is falsified already by I. Then t′i ∈ S and thus t′i /∈ S. The vertex t′i, however,
is adjacent to every element of Y ∪ Y , so it attacks R.
The term ti is not falsified by I but by J . Then t′i /∈ S, and LY (ti) contains some literal
l with l ∈ N(t′i) and J |= l, so l is in R and attacked by t′i.
In addition to these nt attackers, R has |R ∩ (T ′ ∪ T ′)| attackers in N(R) ∩ (T ′ ∪ T ′), as
well as ny · (nt + 1) attackers in Y. As |R| = ny + |R ∩ (T ′ ∪ T ′)|, we obtain in total
|N [R] \ S| = nt + |R ∩ (T ′ ∪ T ′)|+ ny · (nt + 1) = |R|+ nt + ny · nt > |N [R] ∩ S|.
This contradicts S being secure, so for each extension of I to the universally quantified
vertices, ψ is true; hence ϕ is true. J
3.2 Hardness of Secure Set With Forbidden And Necessary Vertices
Next we present a transformation τFNC that eliminates complementary vertex pairs by
turning a Secure SetFNC instance into an equivalent Secure SetFN instance. Along
with τFNC, we define a function σFNCI , for each Secure SetFNC instance I, such that the
solutions of I are in a one-to-one correspondence with those of τFNC(I) in such a way that
any two solutions of I have the same size iff the corresponding solutions of τFNC(I) have
the same size. We use these functions to obtain a polynomial-time reduction from Secure
SetFNC to Secure SetFN as well as from Exact Secure SetFNC to Exact Secure
SetFN.
Before we formally define our reduction, we briefly describe the underlying intuition. The
gadget in Figure 5 is added for every complementary pair (a, b). It is constructed in such
a way that every solution must either contain all of {a, aab, aab1 , . . . , aabn+4} or none of them,
and the same holds for {b, bab, bab1 , . . . , babn+4}. By making the vertex 4ab necessary, every
solution must contain one of these two sets. At the same time, the bound on the solution
size makes sure that we cannot afford to take both sets for any complementary pair.
I Definition 9. We define a function τFNC, which assigns a Secure SetFN instance to each
Secure SetFNC instance I = (G, k, V, V4, C). For this, we use n to denote |V (G)| and first
define a function σFNCI : x 7→ x+ |C| · (n+ 6). For each (a, b) ∈ C, we introduce new vertices
aab, bab and 4ab as well as, for any x ∈ {a, b}, sets of new vertices Y abx c = {xab1 , . . . , xabn+1},
Zabx c = {xabn+2, xabn+3, xabn+4}, Y abx = {xab1 , . . . , xabn+1} and Zabx = {xabn+2, xabn+3, xabn+4}. We use
the notation u⊕ v to denote the set of edges {(u, v), (u, u), (v, v), (u, v), (v, u)}. Now
we define the Secure SetFN instance τFNC(I) = (G′, k′, V ′, V ′4), where k′ = σFNCI (k),
V ′ = V ∪
⋃
(a,b)∈C(Y aba ∪Y abb ∪Zaba ∪Zabb), V ′4 = V4 ∪
⋃
(a,b)∈C{4ab} and G′ is the graph
defined by
V (G′) = V (G)∪
⋃
(a,b)∈C
({4ab, aab, bab}∪Y aba c∪Y abb c ∪Y aba ∪Y abb ∪Zaba c∪Zabb c∪Zaba ∪Zabb),
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Figure 5 Gadget for a pair of complementary vertices (a, b) in the reduction from Secure SetFNC
to Secure SetFN. The vertices a and b may have additional neighbors from the original graph.
E(G′) = E(G) ∪
⋃
(a,b)∈C
⋃
x∈{a,b}
({(4ab, xab)} ∪ ({x} × Y abx c) ∪ ({xab} × Zabx c)
∪
⋃
1≤i≤n+3
xabi ⊕ xabi+1
)
.
We illustrate our construction in Figure 5.
I Lemma 10. Let I = (G, k, V, V4, C) be a Secure SetFNC instance, let A be the set of
solutions of I and let B be the set of solutions of τFNC(I). There is a bijection g : A→ B
such that |g(S)| = σFNCI (|S|) holds for every S ∈ A.
Proof. We use the same auxiliary notation as in Definition 9 and we define g as S 7→
S ∪⋃(a,b)∈C, x∈S∩{a,b}({4ab, xab} ∪ Y abx c ∪ Zabx c). For every S ∈ A, we thus obtain |g(S)| =
σFNCI (|S|), and we first show that indeed g(S) ∈ B.
Let S ∈ A and let S′ denote g(S). Obviously S′ satisfies V ′ ∩ S′ = ∅ and V ′4 ⊆ S′. To
see that S′ is secure in G′, let X ′ be an arbitrary subset of S′. Since S is secure in G and
X ′ ∩ V (G) ⊆ S, there is a defense µ : NG[X ′ ∩ V (G)] \ S → NG[X ′ ∩ V (G)] ∩ S. We now
construct a defense µ′ : NG′ [X ′] \ S′ → NG′ [X ′] ∩ S′. For any attacker v of X ′ in G′, we
distinguish three cases.
If v is some xabi ∈ Y abx ∪ Zabx for some (a, b) ∈ C and x ∈ {a, b}, we set µ′(v) = xabi .
This element is in NG′ [X ′] since v is only adjacent to xabi or neighbors of it.
If v is aab or bab for some (a, b) ∈ C, its only neighbor in X ′ can be 4ab and we set
µ′(v) = 4ab.
Otherwise v is in NG[X ′ ∩ V (G)] \ S (by our construction of S′). Since the codomain of
µ is a subset of the codomain of µ′, we may set µ′(v) = µ(v).
Since µ′ is injective, each attack on X ′ in G′ can be repelled by S′. Hence S′ is secure in G′.
Clearly g is injective. It remains to show that g is surjective. Let S′ be a solution of
τFNC(I). First we make the following observations for each (a, b) ∈ C and each x ∈ {a, b}:
If some xabi ∈ Y abx c is in S′, then Y abx c ∪ Zabx c∪ {x} ⊆ S′ by Observation 4.
If some xabi ∈ Zabx c is in S′, then Y abx c ∪ Zabx c∪ {xab} ⊆ S′ for the same reason.
If x ∈ S′, then Y abx c ∩ S′ 6= ∅. To see this, suppose x ∈ S′. Let Dx consist of those pairs
(c, d) ∈ C such that x ∈ (c, d) and Y cdx c∩S′ 6= ∅, and let Ax consist of those pairs (c, d) ∈ C
such that x ∈ (c, d) and Y cdx c ∩ S′ = ∅. Now let X ′ = {x} ∪ {xcd1 , . . . , xcdn | (c, d) ∈ Dx}.
By the previous observations, X ′ ⊆ S′. The defenders of X ′ are the element x, the
|Dx| · (n + 1) elements of
⋃
(c,d)∈Dx Y
cd
x c and perhaps some elements of NG(x), which
consists of at most n− 1 vertices. The attackers of X ′ are the |Dx| · (n+ 1) elements of⋃
(c,d)∈Dx Y
cd
x, the |Ax| · (n+ 1) elements of
⋃
(c,d)∈Ax Y
cd
x c and perhaps some elements of
NG(x). Thus, if Ax is nonempty, then the set X ′ has more attackers than defenders in
G′. However, S′ is secure, so Ax must be empty, which implies Y abx c ∩ S′ 6= ∅.
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Figure 6 Result of the transformation τFN applied to an example graph with two adjacent
vertices a and b, where b is necessary. Every solution in the depicted graph contains b, w and w′a.
If xab ∈ S′, then Zabx c∩ S′ 6= ∅ by Observation 3.
So for each (a, b) ∈ C and x ∈ {a, b}, S′ contains either all or none of {x, xab} ∪ Y abx c ∪ Zabx c.
For every (a, b) ∈ C, S′ contains aab or bab, since 4ab ∈ S′, whose neighbors are aab
and bab. It follows that |S′| > |C| · (n + 6) even if S′ contains only one of each (a, b) ∈ C.
If, for some (a, b) ∈ C, S′ contained both a and b, we could derive a contradiction to
|S′| ≤ σFNCI (k) = k + |C| · (n+ 6) because then |S′| > (|C|+ 1) · (n+ 6) > σFNCI (k). So S′
contains either a or b for any (a, b) ∈ C.
We construct S = S′ ∩ V (G) and observe that S′ = g(S), V4 ⊆ S, V ∩ S = ∅, and
|S ∩ {a, b}| = 1 for each (a, b) ∈ C. It remains to show that S is secure in G. Let X be an
arbitrary subset of S. We construct X ′ = X ∪⋃(a,b)∈C,x∈X∩{a,b} Y abx c and observe that each
Y abx c we put into X ′ entails |Y abx c ∪ {xabn+2}| = n+2 additional defenders and |Y abx ∪ {xabn+2}| =
n+2 additional attackers of X ′ in G′ compared to X in G; so |NG′ [X ′] ∩ S′|−|NG[X] ∩ S| =
|NG′ [X ′] \ S′| − |NG[X] \ S|. Clearly X ′ ⊆ S′, so |NG′ [X ′] ∩ S′| ≥ |NG′ [X ′] \ S′| as S′ is
secure in G′. We conclude |NG[X] ∩ S| ≥ |NG[X] \ S|. Hence S is secure in G. J
As τFNC is clearly computable in polynomial time, the following result follows:
I Corollary 11. Secure SetFN is ΣP2 -hard.
The instances of Secure SetFNC are identical to the instances of the exact variant,
so τFNC is also applicable to the exact case. In fact it turns out that this gives us also a
reduction from Exact Secure SetFNC to Exact Secure SetFN.
I Corollary 12. Exact Secure SetFN is ΣP2 -hard.
Proof. Let I and I ′ = τFNC(I) be our Exact Secure SetFNC and Exact Secure SetFN
instances, respectively, and let k and k′ denote their respective solution sizes. By Lemma 10,
there is a bijection g between the solutions of I and the solutions of I ′ such that, for every
solution S of I, g(S) has σFNCI (k) = k′ elements, and for every solution S′ of I ′, g−1(S′) has
k elements since σFNCI is invertible. J
3.3 Hardness of Secure Set With Forbidden Vertices
Now we present a transformation τFN that eliminates necessary vertices. Our transformation
not only operates on a problem instance, but also requires an ordering  of the necessary
vertices. For now, we can consider this as an arbitrary ordering. It will become more
important in Section 4.1, where we reuse this transformation for showing W[1]-hardness
w.r.t. treewidth.
14 Complexity of Secure Sets
a
a1 a2 · · · an an+1
a1 a

2 a

n a

n+1
wa
wa w
′
a
w′a
w
Figure 7 Illustration of the gadget that makes sure w and w′a are in every secure set. The
vertex a is a non-necessary, non-forbidden vertex from the Secure SetFN instance and may have
other neighbors from this instance. The vertex w has two neighbors (as depicted here) for each
non-necessary, non-forbidden vertex from the Secure SetFN instance, and additionally the neighbors
depicted in Figure 8.
Before formally defining the transformation τFN, we refer to Figure 6, which shows the
result for a simple example graph with only two vertices a and b, of which b is necessary.
The basic idea is that the vertex w must be in every solution S because any vertex that is in
S also eventually forces w to be in S. Once w ∈ S, the construction to the right of w makes
sure that b ∈ S.
I Definition 13. We define a function τFN, which assigns a Secure SetF instance to each
pair (I,), where I = (G, k, V, V4) is a Secure SetFN instance and  is an ordering of the
elements of V4. For this, let V c denote V (G)\ (V∪V4). We use n to denote |V (G)|, and we
first define a function σFNI : x 7→ xn+ 3x+ n− |V4|+ |V c|+ 2. We use W to denote the set
of new vertices {w}∪{wv, w′v, wv , w′v | v ∈ V c}. The intention is for each wv and w′v to be
forbidden, for w and each w′v to be in every secure set, and for wv to be in a secure set iff v
is in it at the same time. We write V + to denote V4 ∪V c∪{w}; for each v ∈ V +, we use Av
to denote the set of new vertices {v1, . . . , vn+1, v1 , . . . , vn+1}, and we use shorthand notation
A
c
v = {v1, . . . , vn+1} and Av = {v1 , . . . , vn+1}. The intention is for each vi to be forbidden
and for each vi to be in a secure set iff v is in it at the same time. We use the notation u⊕ v
to denote the set of edges {(u, v), (u, u), (v, v), (u, v), (v, u)}. If V4 = ∅, let P = ∅;
otherwise let P be the set consisting of all pairs (u, v) such that v is the direct successor of u
according to , as well as the pair (u,w), where u is the greatest element according to .
Now we define τFN(I,) = (G′, k′, V ′), where V ′ = V ∪ {wv , w′v | v ∈ V c} ∪⋃v∈V + Av ,
k′ = σFNI (k), and G′ is the graph defined by
V (G′) = V (G) ∪W ∪
⋃
v∈V +
Av,
E(G′) = E(G) ∪ {(v, vi) | v ∈ V +, 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1}
∪
⋃
v∈V +, 1≤i≤n
vi ⊕ vi+1 ∪
⋃
(u,v)∈P
un+1 ⊕ v1
∪
⋃
v∈V bvn+1 ⊕ wv ∪ {(w,wv), (w,w′v), (wv, w′v), (wv, w′v ) | v ∈ V c}.
We illustrate our construction in Figure 7 and 8.
We now prove that τFN yields a correct reduction for any ordering .
I Lemma 14. Let I = (G, k, V, V4) be a Secure SetFN instance, let  be an ordering of
V4, let A be the set of solutions of I and let B be the set of solutions of τFN(I,). There is
a bijection g : A→ B such that |g(S)| = σFNI (|S|) holds for every S ∈ A.
Proof. We use the same auxiliary notation as in Definition 13 and we define g as S 7→
S ∪⋃v∈S A cv ∪ A cw ∪ {w} ∪ {w′v | v ∈ V c} ∪ {wv | v ∈ S ∩ V c}. For every S ∈ A, we thus
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Figure 8 Illustration of the gadget that makes sure every secure set contains all necessary vertices
as it must contain w. Here we assume there are the two necessary vertices x and y, and we use the
ordering x  y.
obtain |g(S)| = |S|+ |S|(n+ 1) + (n+ 1) + 1 + |V c|+ (|S| − |V4|) = σFNI (|S|), and we first
show that indeed g(S) ∈ B.
Let S ∈ A and let S′ denote g(S). Obviously S′ satisfies V ′ ∩ S′ = ∅. To see that S′ is
secure in G′, let X ′ be an arbitrary subset of S′. Since S is secure in G and X ′ ∩ V (G) ⊆ S,
there is a defense µ : NG[X ′ ∩ V (G)] \ S → NG[X ′ ∩ V (G)]∩ S. We now construct a defense
µ′ : NG′ [X ′]\S′ → NG′ [X ′]∩S′. For any attacker a of X ′ in G′, we distinguish the following
cases:
If a is some vi ∈ Av for some v ∈ V +, then a can only attack either vi or a neighbor of
vi, all of which are in S′, and we set µ′(a) = vi.
Similarly, if a is wv for some v ∈ V c, then we set µ′(a) = wv.
If a is w′v for some v ∈ V c, then a attacks wv and we set µ′(a) = w′v.
If a is wv for some v ∈ V c, then it attacks w or w′v, which is not used for repelling any
attack because w′v cannot attack X ′, so we set µ′(a) = w′v.
Otherwise a is in NG[X ′ ∩ V (G)] \ S (by our construction of S′). Since the codomain of
µ is a subset of the codomain of µ′, we may set µ′(a) = µ(a).
Since µ′ is injective, each attack on X ′ in G′ can be repelled by S′. Hence S′ is secure in G′.
Clearly g is injective. It remains to show that g is surjective. Let S′ be a solution of
τFN(I,). We first show that V4 ∪ {w} ⊆ S′:
If S′ contains some v ∈ V4 ∪ V c, then S′ contains an element of A cv by Observation 3.
If S′ contains an element of A cv for some v ∈ V +, then {v} ∪A cv ⊆ S′ by Observation 4.
If vn+1 ∈ S′ for some v ∈ V c, then wv ∈ S′ for the same reason.
Furthermore, if S′ contains an element of A cv for some v ∈ V4 ∪ {w}, then also A cu ⊆ S′
for every u ∈ V4 ∪ {w} for the same reason.
If wv ∈ S′ for some v ∈ V c, then {w,w′v, vn+1} ⊆ S′ by Observation 4.
If w′v ∈ S′ for some v ∈ V c, then w ∈ S′ because at least wv or w must be in S′ and the
former implies w ∈ S′ as we have seen.
The previous observations show that any vertex being in S′ implies w ∈ S′. Since S′
is nonempty, it follows that w ∈ S′. We now show that S′ contains an element of A cw.
Suppose the contrary, let U = S′∩{wv | v ∈ V c}, let U ′ = S′∩{w′v | v ∈ V c} and consider
X ′ = {w} ∪ U . The defenders of X ′ consist of exactly 1 + |U ′|+ 2|U | elements, whereas
there are exactly (n+1)+(|V c|−|U ′|)+(|V c|−|U |)+3|U | attackers. With |V c| ≥ |U ′| ≥ |U |
and n > 0 in mind, we arrive at the contradiction |NG′ [X ′] ∩ S′| < |NG′ [X ′] \ S′|.
The previous observations show that for every v ∈ V4 ∪ {w} it holds that {v} ∪A cv ⊆ S′.
Finally, we show that {w′v | v ∈ V c} ⊆ S′. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that
there is some u ∈ V c such that w′u /∈ S′. We have seen that the latter can only be the case
if u /∈ S′. Observe that {w} ∪ {wi | 2 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1} ∪ {wv | v ∈ V c∩ S′} is a subset of S′
that is attacked by {w′u}∪Aw ∪{vn+1, wv , w′v | v ∈ V c∩S′}∪{wv | v ∈ V c\S′}, but the
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defenders are a proper subset of {w}∪A cw∪{vn+1, wv, w′v | v ∈ V c∩S′}∪{w′v | v ∈ V c\S′}.
This contradicts S′ being secure in G′.
Let S = S′ ∩V (G). By the previous observations, it is easy to see that S′ = g(S). It remains
to show that S is secure in G. Let X be an arbitrary subset of S. We construct X ′ =
X∪⋃v∈X A cv and observe that the number of additional defenders of X ′ in G′ compared to X
in G is equal to the number of additional attackers; formally |NG′ [X ′] ∩ S′| − |NG[X] ∩ S| =
|NG′ [X ′] \ S′| − |NG[X] \ S|. Clearly X ′ ⊆ S′, so |NG′ [X ′] ∩ S′| ≥ |NG′ [X ′] \ S′| as S′ is
secure in G′. Consequently |NG[X] ∩ S| ≥ |NG[X] \ S|. Hence S is secure in G. J
Given an ordering , clearly τFN(I,) is computable in polynomial time. We can thus
easily obtain a reduction from Secure SetFN to Secure SetF by first computing an
arbitrary ordering  of the necessary vertices in polynomial time. This also gives us a
hardness result for the exact case, analogous to Corollary 12.
I Corollary 15. Secure SetF and Exact Secure SetF are ΣP2 -hard.
3.4 Hardness of Secure Set
We now introduce a transformation τF that eliminates forbidden vertices. The basic idea
is that we ensure that a forbidden vertex f is never part of a solution by adding so many
neighbors to f that we could only defend f by exceeding the bound on the solution size.
I Definition 16. We define a function τF, which assigns a Secure Set instance to each
Secure SetF instance I = (G, k, V). For each f ∈ V, we introduce new vertices
f ′, f1, . . . , f2k. Now we define τF(I) = (G′, k), where G′ is the graph defined by
V (G′) = V (G) ∪ {f ′, f1, . . . , f2k | f ∈ V},
E(G′) = E(G) ∪ {(f, fi), (f ′, fi) | f ∈ V, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k}.
I Lemma 17. Every Secure SetF instance I has the same solutions as the Secure Set
instance τF(I).
Proof. Let I = (G, k, V) and τF(I) = (G′, k). Each secure set S in G is also secure in
G′ because the subgraph of G induced by NG[S] is equal to the subgraph of G′ induced
by NG′ [S]. Now let S′ be a solution of τF(I). For every f ∈ V, neither f nor f ′ are in
S′ because each of these vertices has at least 2k neighbors, and S′ cannot contain any fi
because NG′(fi) = {f, f ′}. Hence S′ is also secure in G as the subgraphs induced by the
respective neighborhoods are again equal. J
This immediately yields the following result.
I Corollary 18. Secure Set and Exact Secure Set are ΣP2 -hard.
4 Complexity of Secure Set Parameterized by Treewidth
In this section we study the parameterized complexity of the Secure Set problem when
treewidth is the parameter.
We first show that all variants of Secure Set considered in this paper are W[1]-hard for
this parameter by reusing some reductions from Section 3 and proving that they preserve
bounded treewidth. Under the widely held assumption that FPT 6= W[1], this rules out
fixed-parameter tractable algorithms for these problems.
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Second, we show that the co-NP-complete Secure Set Verification problem is
solvable in linear time on instances whose treewidth is bounded by a constant. We do this
by providing a fixed-parameter linear algorithm that performs dynamic programming on a
tree decomposition of the input graph. Although bounded treewidth most likely does not
lead to fixed-parameter tractability of the problem of finding secure sets, this proves that it
does for the problem of verifying whether a given set is secure.
Third, we show that all the variants of the Secure Set problem considered in this paper
are solvable in polynomial time on instances whose treewidth is bounded by a constant. We
again do this by providing a polynomial-time dynamic programming algorithm, but this time
the degree of the polynomial depends on the treewidth.
4.1 Hardness of Secure Set Parameterized by Treewidth
In this subsection, we prove the following theorem:
I Theorem 19. The following problems are all W[1]-hard when parameterized by treewidth:
Secure Set, Exact Secure Set, Secure SetF, Exact Secure SetF, Secure SetFN,
Exact Secure SetFN, Secure SetFNC, and Exact Secure SetFNC.
To prove this, we reduce from the following problem [3], which is known to be W[1]-hard [29]
parameterized by the treewidth of the graph:
Minimum Maximum Outdegree
Input: A graph G, an edge weighting w : E(G)→ N+ given in unary and a positive
integer r
Question: Is there an orientation of the edges of G such that, for each v ∈ V (G), the
sum of the weights of outgoing edges from v is at most r?
I Lemma 20. Secure SetFNC and Exact Secure SetFNC, both parameterized by the
treewidth of the primal graph, are W[1]-hard.
Proof. Let an instance of Minimum Maximum Outdegree be given by a graph G, an
edge weighting w : E(G)→ N+ in unary and a positive integer r. From this we construct
an instance of both Secure SetFNC and Exact Secure SetFNC. An example is given
in Figure 9. For each v ∈ V (G), we define the set of new vertices Hv = {hv1, . . . , hvr−1},
and for each (u, v) ∈ E(G), we define the sets of new vertices Vuv = {uv1, . . . , uvw(u,v)} and
Vvu = {vu1 , . . . , vuw(u,v)}. We now define the graph G′ with
V (G′) = V (G) ∪
⋃
v∈V (G)
Hv ∪
⋃
(u,v)∈E(G)
(Vuv ∪ Vvu),
E(G′) = {(v, h) | v ∈ V (G), h ∈ Hv}
∪ {(u, x) | (u, v) ∈ E(G), x ∈ Vuv} ∪ {(x, v) | (u, v) ∈ E(G), x ∈ Vvu}
∪ {(uvi , vui ) | (u, v) ∈ E(G), 1 ≤ i ≤ w(u, v)}.
We also define the set of complementary vertex pairs C = {(uvi , vui ) | (u, v) ∈ E(G), 1 ≤
i ≤ w(u, v)} ∪ {(vui , uvi+1) | (u, v) ∈ E(G), 1 ≤ i < w(u, v)}. Finally, we define the set of
necessary vertices V4 = V (G) ∪
⋃
v∈V (G)Hv and k = |V4| +
∑
(u,v)∈E(G) w(u, v). We use
I to denote (G′, k, C, V4, ∅), which is an instance of Secure SetFNC and also of Exact
Secure SetFNC. Obviously I is a positive instance of Secure SetFNC iff it is a positive
instance of Exact Secure SetFNC because the necessary and complementary vertices make
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a
ab2
ab1
ab3
ba1
ba2
ba3
b
ha1
ha2
hb1
hb2
Figure 9 Result of our transformation on a sample Minimum Maximum Outdegree instance
with r = 3 and two vertices a, b that are connected by an edge of weight 3. Complementary vertex
pairs are shown via dashed lines. Necessary vertices have a 4 symbol next to their name.
sure that every solution of the Secure SetFNC instance I has exactly k elements. Hence we
only consider Secure SetFNC.
The intention is that for each orientation of G we have a solution candidate S in I
such that an edge orientation from u to v entails Vvu ⊆ S and Vuv ∩ S = ∅, and the other
orientation entails Vuv ⊆ S and Vvu ∩ S = ∅. For each outgoing edge of v in the orientation
of G, there are as many attackers of v in I as the weight of that edge. Together with Hv, v
can repel up to r such attacks. The other neighbors of v that are in S cannot help v since
they are in turn attacked by their neighbors.
Clearly I can be computed in polynomial time. We now show that the treewidth of the
primal graph of I depends only on the treewidth of G. We do so by modifying an optimal
tree decomposition T of G as follows:
1. For each (u, v) ∈ E(G), we take an arbitrary node whose bag B contains both u and
v and add to its children a chain of nodes N1, . . . , Nw(u,v)−1 such that the bag of Ni is
B ∪ {uvi , uvi+1, vui , vui+1}.
2. For each v ∈ V (G), we take an arbitrary node whose bag B contains v and add to its
children a chain of nodes N1, . . . , Nr−1 such that the bag of Ni is B ∪ {hvi }.
It is easy to verify that the result is a valid tree decomposition of the primal graph of I and
its width is at most the treewidth of G plus four.
We claim that (G,w, r) is a positive instance of Minimum Maximum Outdegree iff I
is a positive instance of Secure SetFNC.
“Only if” direction. Let D be the directed graph given by an orientation of the edges of
G such that for each vertex the sum of weights of outgoing edges is at most r. The set
S = V4 ∪ {vu1 , . . . , vuw(u,v) | (u, v) ∈ E(D)} is secure in G: Let X be an arbitrary subset of S.
Every attacker must be some element uvi . If vui ∈ X, then we can use vui to repel the attack
from uvi . Otherwise u ∈ X, so we can use either u or one of the r− 1 elements of Hu to repel
the attack from uvi . These are sufficiently many defenders: For every vertex v ∈ V (G) ∩X,
at most r neighbors attack v as otherwise the sum of weights of outgoing edges of v in D
would be greater than r. Finally, it is easy to verify that |S| = k, V4 ⊆ S, and exactly one
element of each pair of complementary vertices is in S.
“If” direction. Let S be a solution of I. For every (u, v) ∈ E(G), either Vuv ⊆ S or Vvu ⊆ S
due to the complementary vertex pairs. We define a directed graph D by V (D) = V (G) and
E(D) = {(u, v) | Vvu ⊆ S} ∪ {(v, u) | Vuv ⊆ S}. Suppose there is a vertex v in D whose
sum of weights of outgoing edges is greater than r. We construct X = {v} ∪⋃(u,v)∈E(D) Vvu,
which is a subset of S. Now v has more than r attacking neighbors, but all defenders except
v and Hv must already defend themselves against their attacking neighbor. This contradicts
S being secure. J
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Now we reduce from Secure SetFNC to Secure SetFN to show W[1]-hardness of the
latter problem. We reuse the function τFNC from Definition 9 and show that this gives us a
reduction that preserves bounded treewidth.
I Lemma 21. Secure SetFN, parameterized by the treewidth of the graph, is W[1]-hard.
Proof. Let I be a Secure SetFNC instance whose primal graph we denote by G. We
obtain an equivalent Secure SetFN instance τFNC(I), whose graph we denote by G′. This
reduction is correct, as shown in Lemma 10. It remains to show that the treewidth of G′ is
bounded by a function of the treewidth of G. Let T be an optimal nice tree decomposition
of G. We build a tree decomposition T ′ of G′ by modifying a copy of T in the following
way: For every pair (a, b) of complementary vertices, we pick an arbitrary node t in T
whose bag B contains both a and b, and we add a chain of nodes N1, . . . , N2n+3 between
t and its parent such that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1, the bag of Ni is B ∪ {aabi , aabi , aabi+1, aabi+1 },
the bag of Nn+2 is B ∪ {aab, bab,4ab} ∪ Zaba c∪ Zaba ∪ Zabb c∪ Zabb, and the bag of Nn+2+i is
B∪{babn+3−i, babn+3−1, babn+2−i, babn+2−i}. It is easy to verify that T ′ is a valid tree decomposition
of G′. Furthermore, the width of T ′ is at most the width of T plus 15. J
Just like before, we get an analogous result for the exact variant. It can be proved in the
same way as Corollary 12.
I Corollary 22. Exact Secure SetFN, parameterized by the treewidth of the graph, is
W[1]-hard.
We next show W[1]-hardness of Secure SetF by reducing from Secure SetFN using
the function τFN from Definition 13. This function maps a Secure SetFN instance, together
with an ordering  of the necessary vertices, to an equivalent Secure SetF instance. We
show that by choosing  appropriately, this gives us a reduction that preserves bounded
treewidth.
I Lemma 23. Secure SetF, parameterized by the treewidth of the graph, is W[1]-hard.
Proof. Let I = (G, k, V, V4) be a Secure SetFN instance and let T be an optimal nice
tree decomposition of G. We can compute such a tree decomposition in FPT time [6]. Let 
be the ordering of the elements of V4 that is obtained in linear time by doing a post-order
traversal of T and sequentially recording the elements that occur for the last time in the
current bag. We obtain the Secure SetF instance τFN(I,), whose graph we denote by G′.
This reduction is correct, as shown in Lemma 14, and computable in FPT time. It remains
to show that the treewidth of G′ is bounded by a function of the treewidth of G. To this
end, we use T to build a tree decomposition T ′ of G′. We initially set T ′ := T and modify
it by the following steps:
1. We insert w into every bag.
2. For every (u, v) ∈ P , we add v, v1 and v1 into the bag of every node between (and
including) tT ′u and tT
′
v . Note that the bag of tT
′
u contains both u and v. After this step,
we have increased the bag size of each node by at most five.
3. For each v ∈ V +, we use Bv to denote the bag of tT ′v and replace tT
′
v by a chain of nodes
N1, . . . , Nn, where Nn is the topmost node and the bag of Ni is Bv ∪ {vi, vi , vi+1, vi+1}.
After this step, note that, for each (u, v) ∈ P , the bag of the new node tT ′u contains un+1,
un+1, v1 and v1 .
4. For each v ∈ V c, we add wv, wv , w′v and w′v to the bag of tT ′v , which already contains
w, vn+1, vn+1.
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It is easy to verify that T ′ is a valid tree decomposition of G′. Furthermore, the width of T ′
is at most the width of T plus twelve. J
We again get an analogous result for the exact variant.
I Corollary 24. Exact Secure SetF, parameterized by the treewidth of the graph, is
W[1]-hard.
Finally, we show W[1]-hardness of Secure Set by reducing from Secure SetF while
preserving bounded treewidth.
I Lemma 25. Secure Set, parameterized by the treewidth of the graph, is W[1]-hard.
Proof. Let I = (G, k, V) be a Secure SetF instance, let G′ denote the graph of τF(I) and
let T be an optimal nice tree decomposition of G. We build a tree decomposition T ′ of G′
by modifying a copy of T in the following way: For every f ∈ V, we pick an arbitrary node
t in T whose bag B contains f , and we add a chain of nodes N1, . . . , N2k between t and its
parent such that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k, the bag of Ni is B ∪ {f ′, fi}. It is easy to verify that T ′ is
a valid tree decomposition of G′. Furthermore, the width of T ′ is at most the width of T
plus two. J
We again get an analogous result for the exact variant.
I Corollary 26. Exact Secure Set, parameterized by the treewidth of the input graph, is
W[1]-hard.
4.2 A Fixed-Parameter Tractable Algorithm for Secure Set Verification
While we have seen in Section 4.1 that Secure Set parameterized by treewidth is most
likely not FPT, we now present a positive result: The co-NP-complete [21] Secure Set
Verification problem, which consists of checking whether a given set Ŝ is secure in a graph
G, is FPT parameterized by the treewidth of G. We show this by giving a fixed-parameter
linear algorithm that follows the principle of dynamic programming on a tree decomposition
T of G. The core idea is the following: For each node t of T and each X ⊆ Ŝ ∩χ(t), we store
an integer c
Ŝ,t
(X), which indicates that X can be extended to a set X̂ ⊆ Ŝ using “forgotten”
vertices from further down in T in such a way that the difference between defenders and
attackers of X̂ is c
Ŝ,t
(X) and X̂ is the “worst” subset of Ŝ that can be obtained in this way.
To compute these values, we traverse T from the bottom up and use recurrence relations to
compute the values for the current node t of T based on the values we have computed for
the children of t. If we then look at the values we have computed at the root of T , we can
decide if there is a subset of Ŝ that is “bad enough” to witness that Ŝ is not secure.
Dynamic programming algorithms like this are quite common for showing FPT member-
ship w.r.t. treewidth and some examples can be found in [26]. Proving their correctness is a
usually rather tedious structural induction argument along the tree decomposition: At every
node t of T , we have to prove that the recurrence relations indeed characterize the value
they are supposed to represent. Examples of such proofs can be found in [13].
We now formally define the values that we will compute at each tree decomposition
node. Let G be a graph with a nice tree decomposition T and let Ŝ ⊆ V (G) be the
candidate for which we want to check if it is secure. For each node t of T and each set
of vertices A, we define At = {a ∈ A | a ∈ χ(t′), t′ is a descendant of t}. For any X̂ ⊆ Ŝ,
we call |NG[X̂]t ∩ Ŝ| − |NG[X̂]t \ Ŝ| the score of X̂ w.r.t. Ŝ at t (or just the score of X̂ if
Ŝ and t are clear from the context) and denote it by score
Ŝ,t
(X̂). Furthermore, we call
B. Bliem and S. Woltran 21
|NG[X̂] ∩ χ(t) ∩ Ŝ| − |(NG[X̂] ∩ χ(t)) \ Ŝ| the local score of X̂ w.r.t. Ŝ at t and denote it by
lscore
Ŝ,t
(X̂). Finally, for each X ⊆ Ŝ ∩ χ(t), we define the value
c
Ŝ,t
(X) = min
X̂⊆Ŝt, X̂∩χ(t)=X
{score
Ŝ,t
(X̂)}.
When r is the root of T , both Ŝr = Ŝ and χ(r) = ∅ hold, so Ŝ is secure if and only if cŜ,r(∅)
is nonnegative.
We now describe how to compute all such values in a bottom-up manner by distinguishing
the node type of t, and we prove the correctness of our computation by structural induction
along the way. In this correctness proof, we use additional terminology: We say that a set
X̂ is an extension of X w.r.t. Ŝ at t if it is one of those sets considered in the definition of
c
Ŝ,t
(X) that has minimum score; formally X̂ ⊆ Ŝt, X̂ ∩χ(t) = X and scoreŜ,t(X̂) = cŜ,t(X).
We may omit Ŝ or t if they are clear from the context.
Leaf node. If t is a leaf node, then its bag is empty and obviously c
Ŝ,t
(∅) = 0 holds.
Introduce node. Let t be an introduce node with child t′, let v be the unique element of
χ(t) \χ(t′), let X ⊆ Ŝ ∩χ(t) and let X ′ = X \ {v}. We prove that the following equation
holds:
c
Ŝ,t
(X) =

c
Ŝ,t′(X
′) + 1 if v ∈ NG[X] ∩ Ŝ
c
Ŝ,t′(X
′)− 1 if v ∈ NG[X] \ Ŝ
c
Ŝ,t′(X
′) otherwise
First consider the case where v ∈ NG[X] ∩ Ŝ. Let X̂ be an extension of X at t, so
score
Ŝ,t
(X̂) = c
Ŝ,t
(X). From v /∈ NG[X̂\{v}]t′ and v ∈ NG[X̂]t∩Ŝ we infer scoreŜ,t(X̂) =
score
Ŝ,t′(X̂ \ {v}) + 1. Moreover, the set X̂ \ {v} is one of the candidates considered for
an extension of X ′ in the definition of c
Ŝ,t′ , so we obtain cŜ,t′(X
′) ≤ score
Ŝ,t′(X̂ \ {v}).
In total, this gives us c
Ŝ,t
(X) ≥ c
Ŝ,t′(X
′) + 1. Conversely, let X̂ ′ be an extension of X ′
at t′, so score
Ŝ,t′(X̂
′) = c
Ŝ,t′(X
′). We distinguish two cases.
1. If v ∈ X, then from v /∈ NG[X̂ ′]t′ and v ∈ NG[X̂ ′ ∪ {v}]t ∩ Ŝ we infer scoreŜ,t(X̂ ′ ∪
{v}) = score
Ŝ,t′(X̂
′) + 1. Since X = X ′ ∪ {v} and X ′ = X̂ ′ ∩ χ(t′), it holds that
X = (X̂ ′ ∪ {v}) ∩ χ(t). Hence the set X̂ ′ ∪ {v} is one of the candidates considered for
an extension of X in the definition of c
Ŝ,t
and we obtain c
Ŝ,t
(X) ≤ score
Ŝ,t
(X̂ ′ ∪ {v}).
2. Otherwise v /∈ X. In this case X = X ′, v /∈ X̂ ′ and X = X̂ ′ ∩ χ(t). Hence the set X̂ ′
is considered in the definition of c
Ŝ,t
(X) and we get c
Ŝ,t
(X) ≤ score
Ŝ,t
(X̂ ′). Since v is
adjacent to an element of X, we infer score
Ŝ,t
(X̂ ′) = score
Ŝ,t′(X̂
′) + 1.
In both cases, we obtain c
Ŝ,t
(X) ≤ c
Ŝ,t′(X
′) + 1, so indeed c
Ŝ,t
(X) = c
Ŝ,t′(X
′) + 1.
Next consider the case where v ∈ NG[X] \ Ŝ. Clearly v /∈ X. Let X̂ be an extension of
X at t, so score
Ŝ,t
(X̂) = c
Ŝ,t
(X). From v /∈ NG[X̂]t′ and v ∈ NG[X̂]t \ Ŝ we now infer
score
Ŝ,t
(X̂) = score
Ŝ,t′(X̂) − 1. Similar to before, by definition of cŜ,t′(X ′) we obtain
c
Ŝ,t′(X
′) ≤ score
Ŝ,t′(X̂). In total, this gives us cŜ,t(X) ≥ cŜ,t′(X ′)−1. Conversely, let X̂ ′
be an extension of X ′ at t′, so score
Ŝ,t′(X̂
′) = c
Ŝ,t′(X
′). Since v /∈ X̂ ′ and X = X̂ ′ ∩χ(t),
X̂ ′ is considered in the definition of c
Ŝ,t
(X) and we get c
Ŝ,t
(X) ≤ score
Ŝ,t
(X̂ ′). Since
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v is adjacent to an element of X, we infer score
Ŝ,t
(X̂ ′) = score
Ŝ,t′(X̂
′)− 1. We obtain
c
Ŝ,t
(X) ≤ c
Ŝ,t′(X
′)− 1, so indeed c
Ŝ,t
(X) = c
Ŝ,t′(X
′)− 1.
Finally consider the remaining case where v /∈ NG[X] and, in particular, v /∈ X holds as
well as X = X ′. Using elementary set theory with Ŝt \{v} = Ŝt′ and χ(t) = χ(t′)∪{v} in
mind, we can prove that {X̂ ⊆ Ŝt | X̂ ∩χ(t) = X} is equal to {X̂ ⊆ Ŝt′ | X̂ ∩χ(t′) = X ′}.
Hence a set X̂ is considered in the definition of c
Ŝ,t
(X) iff it is considered in the definition
of c
Ŝ,t′(X
′). For every X̂ ⊆ Ŝt such that X̂ ∩ χ(t) = X, observe that v /∈ NG[X̂]t, since
v is not adjacent to any element of X and if it were adjacent to some element of X̂ \X,
then T would not be a valid tree decomposition. This proves that every such X̂ has the
same score at t and t′. Hence c
Ŝ,t
(X) = c
Ŝ,t′(X
′).
Forget node. Let t be a forget node with child t′, let v be the unique element of χ(t′) \ χ(t)
and let X ⊆ Ŝ ∩ χ(t). We prove that the following equation holds:
c
Ŝ,t
(X) =
{
min{c
Ŝ,t′(X), cŜ,t′(X ∪ {v})} if v ∈ Ŝ
c
Ŝ,t′(X) otherwise
Clearly Ŝt = Ŝt′ and all scores at forget nodes are identical to those in the respective child
node. The case where v /∈ Ŝ is trivial as then Ŝ ∩ χ(t) = Ŝ ∩ χ(t′), i.e., the domains of
c
Ŝ,t
and c
Ŝ,t′ are equal, and the sets considered in the definitions of cŜ,t(X) and cŜ,t′(X)
are the same. Hence we consider the case where v ∈ Ŝ.
Let X̂ be an extension of X at t, so c
Ŝ,t
(X) = score
Ŝ,t
(X̂) = score
Ŝ,t′(X̂). If v /∈ X̂, then
X̂ ∩ χ(t′) = X, so we obtain c
Ŝ,t′(X) ≤ scoreŜ,t′(X̂) by definition of cŜ,t′(X). On the
other hand, if v ∈ X̂, then X̂∩χ(t′) = X∪{v}, so we obtain c
Ŝ,t′(X∪{v}) ≤ scoreŜ,t′(X̂).
As one of these two inequalities applies, we get c
Ŝ,t
(X) ≥ min{c
Ŝ,t′(X), cŜ,t′(X ∪ {v})}.
Conversely, every extension X̂ ′ of X at t′ is considered in the definition of c
Ŝ,t
(X), so
c
Ŝ,t
(X) ≤ score
Ŝ,t
(X̂ ′) = score
Ŝ,t′(X̂
′) = c
Ŝ,t′(X). Moreover, every extension X̂
′ of
X ∪ {v} at t′ is also considered in the definition of c
Ŝ,t
(X), so c
Ŝ,t
(X) ≤ score
Ŝ,t
(X̂ ′) =
score
Ŝ,t′(X̂
′) = c
Ŝ,t′(X ∪ {v}). If we combine these two inequalities, we get cŜ,t(X) ≤
min{c
Ŝ,t′(X), cŜ,t′(X ∪ {v})}. Hence cŜ,t(X) = min{cŜ,t′(X), cŜ,t′(X ∪ {v})}.
Join node. Let t be a join node with children t′, t′′ such that χ(t) = χ(t′) = χ(t′′), and let
X ⊆ Ŝ ∩ χ(t). We prove that the following equation holds:
c
Ŝ,t
(X) = c
Ŝ,t′(X) + cŜ,t′′(X)− lscoreŜ,t(X)
Let X̂ be an extension of X at t, so score
Ŝ,t
(X̂) = c
Ŝ,t
(X). The set X̂ ′ = X̂ ∩ Ŝt′ satisfies
X̂ ′ ∩ χ(t′) = X, so c
Ŝ,t′(X) ≤ scoreŜ,t′(X̂ ′). Symmetrically, for X̂ ′′ = X̂ ∩ Ŝt′′ it holds
that c
Ŝ,t′′(X) ≤ scoreŜ,t′′(X̂ ′′).
There is no element of V (G)t′′ \χ(t) that is adjacent to an element of X̂ ′ \X, otherwise T
would not be a valid tree decomposition. Hence NG[X̂ ′]t = NG[X̂ ′]t′ , and symmetrically
NG[X̂ ′′]t = NG[X̂ ′′]t′′ . This entails scoreŜ,t(X̂
′) = score
Ŝ,t′(X̂
′) and score
Ŝ,t
(X̂ ′′) =
score
Ŝ,t′′(X̂
′′).
Since NG[X̂]t ∩ Ŝ is the union of NG[X̂ ′]t ∩ Ŝ and NG[X̂ ′′]t ∩ Ŝ, and these latter two sets
have NG[X]∩χ(t)∩ Ŝ as their intersection, we can apply the inclusion-exclusion principle
to obtain |NG[X̂]t ∩ Ŝ| = |NG[X̂ ′]t ∩ Ŝ|+|NG[X̂ ′′]t ∩ Ŝ|−|NG[X] ∩ χ(t) ∩ Ŝ|. In a similar
way, we get |NG[X̂]t \ Ŝ| = |NG[X̂ ′]t \ Ŝ| + |NG[X̂ ′′]t \ Ŝ| − |(NG[X] ∩ χ(t)) \ Ŝ)|. We
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can establish score
Ŝ,t
(X̂) = score
Ŝ,t
(X̂ ′) + score
Ŝ,t
(X̂ ′′)− lscore
Ŝ,t
(X) by putting these
equations together. The inequalities we have derived before now allow us to conclude
c
Ŝ,t
(X) ≥ c
Ŝ,t′(X) + cŜ,t′′(X)− lscoreŜ,t(X).
Now let X̂ ′ and X̂ ′′ be extensions of X at t′ and at t′′, respectively. We have that
c
Ŝ,t′(X) = scoreŜ,t′(X̂
′) and c
Ŝ,t′′(X) = scoreŜ,t′′(X̂
′′). The set X̂ = X̂ ′ ∪ X̂ ′′ is clearly
considered in the definition of c
Ŝ,t
(X), so c
Ŝ,t
(X) ≤ score
Ŝ,t
(X̂). Following the same
reasoning as before, we obtain score
Ŝ,t
(X̂) = score
Ŝ,t
(X̂ ′) + score
Ŝ,t
(X̂ ′′)− lscore
Ŝ,t
(X).
This gives us c
Ŝ,t
(X) ≤ c
Ŝ,t′(X) + cŜ,t′′(X)− lscoreŜ,t(X). Hence cŜ,t(X) = cŜ,t′(X) +
c
Ŝ,t′′(X)− lscoreŜ,t(X).
Using these recurrence relations, we can traverse the tree decomposition T in a bottom-up
way and compute at each node t of T the value c
Ŝ,t
(X) for each X ⊆ Ŝ∩χ(t). Hence for each
node of T we compute at most 2w values, where w is the width of T . By choosing the right
data structure for adjacency tests [13, Exercise 7.16], each value can be computed in time
O(w3). Since T has O(w · |V (G)|) many nodes and T can be computed in fixed-parameter
linear time [6], (in fact in time 2O(w3) · |V (G)| as observed by [9]), we thus get an algorithm
with fixed-parameter linear running time for checking whether a given set Ŝ is secure.
I Theorem 27. Given a graph G, a tree decomposition of G of weight w and a set Ŝ ⊆ V (G),
we can decide in time O(2w · w4 · |V (G)|) whether Ŝ is secure in G.
Our algorithm can easily be adjusted to find a witness if Ŝ is not secure, i.e., to print
a subset of Ŝ that has more attackers than defenders. After c
Ŝ,t
has been computed for
each t, this can be done via a final top-down traversal by a standard technique in dynamic
programming on tree decompositions [26]: Alongside each value c
Ŝ,t
(X), we store the “origin”
of this value and recursively combine the origins of c
Ŝ,r
(∅), where r is the root of T .
In our definition of the Secure Set Verification problem, we were only concerned
with checking whether a set is secure, but we did not mention the additional constructs that
we consider in this paper, like complementary vertex pairs or necessary or forbidden vertices.
However, these additions pose no difficulty at all because we can just check the respective
conditions in linear time.
4.3 A Polynomial Algorithm for Secure Set on Bounded Treewidth
We now present an algorithm for finding secure sets, not just verifying whether a given set is
secure. Our algorithm works by dynamic programming on a tree decomposition of the input
and extends the algorithm from Section 4.2. For graphs of bounded treewidth, the algorithm
presented in this section runs in polynomial time. However, in contrast to the algorithm
in Section 4.2, it is not an FPT algorithm since the degree of the polynomial depends on
the treewidth. This is to be expected since the problem of finding secure sets of a certain
size is W[1]-hard when parameterized by treewidth, as we have shown in Lemma 25. Our
algorithm provides an upper bound for the complexity of this problem, namely membership
in the class XP.
Let G be a graph with a nice tree decomposition T , and let t be a node of T . In
Section 4.2, we were given one particular secure set candidate Ŝ that we wanted to check, so
we only computed one value for each X ⊆ Ŝ ∩ χ(t), namely the lowest score of any X̂ ⊆ Ŝt
whose intersection with χ(t) is X. Here, in contrast, we cannot restrict ourselves to only
one secure set candidate, and multiple candidates may have the same intersection with χ(t).
We therefore compute multiple objects for each subset of χ(t), since two subsets of V (G)t
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that have the same intersection with χ(t) may have to be distinguished due to their subsets
having different scores.
Let S ⊆ χ(t). By FS we denote the set of functions from 2S to an integer. Let c ∈ FS
and let k be an integer. We say that a set Ŝ ⊆ V (G)t is (S, t, c, k)-characterized if |Ŝ| = k,
Ŝ ∩ χ(t) = S and, for each X ⊆ S, it holds that c(X) = c
Ŝ,t
(X), where c
Ŝ,t
is the function
defined in Section 4.2. For each S ⊆ χ(t), we now define the set
CS,t = {(c, k) | there is a (S, t, c, k)-characterized set}.
When r is the root of T , there is a secure set of size k in G if and only if there is an element
(c, k) ∈ C∅,r such that c(∅) ≥ 0. To see this, first suppose there is a secure set Ŝ of size k in G.
Then there is a function c : {∅} → Z such that Ŝ is (∅, r, c, k)-characterized, so (c, k) ∈ C∅,r
and c(∅) = c
Ŝ,r
(∅), which means that c(∅) is the lowest score of any subset of Ŝ. Since Ŝ is
secure in G, this number is nonnegative. For the other direction, let (c, k) ∈ C∅,r such that
c(∅) ≥ 0. Then there is a (∅, r, c, k)-characterized set Ŝ, obviously of size k. Since c(∅) ≥ 0,
the lowest score of any subset of Ŝ is nonnegative, which proves that Ŝ is secure in G.
We now describe how to compute all such values in a bottom-up manner.
Leaf node. If t is a leaf node, its bag is empty and obviously C∅,t = {(c, 0)} holds, where c
maps ∅ to 0.
Introduce node. Let t be an introduce node with child t′ and let v be the unique element
of χ(t) \ χ(t′). For each S ⊆ χ(t) and each function c ∈ FS\{v}, we define a function
c⊕S,t v : 2S → Z. Its intended purpose is to obtain a version of c that applies to t instead
of t′. If v ∈ S, we need to increase scores where v can serve as an additional defender,
and otherwise we need to decrease scores where v can serve as an additional attacker.
We now make this formal. Let S ⊆ χ(t), X ⊆ S, X ′ = X \ {v} and c ∈ FS\{v}.
(c⊕S,t v)(X) =

c(X ′) + 1 if v ∈ NG[X] ∩ S
c(X ′)− 1 if v ∈ NG[X] \ S
c(X ′) otherwise
For each S ⊆ χ(t) and each function c ∈ FS there is a unique function c′ ∈ FS\{v} such
that c = c′ ⊕S,t v, and we denote c′ by originS,t(c).
The following statements can be proved by arguments similar to those in Section 4.2:
Let Ŝ ⊆ V (G)t′ , S = Ŝ ∩ χ(t′) and (c, k) ∈ CS,t′ such that Ŝ is (S, t′, c, k)-characterized.
The set Ŝ ∪ {v} is (S ∪ {v}, t, c⊕S∪{v},t v, k + 1)-characterized and Ŝ is (S, t, c⊕S,t v, k)-
characterized. Hence (c⊕S∪{v},tv, k+1) ∈ CS∪{v},t and (c⊕S,tv, k) ∈ CS,t. Conversely, let
Ŝ ⊆ V (G)t, S = Ŝ ∩ χ(t) and (c, k) ∈ CS,t such that Ŝ is (S, t, c, k)-characterized, and let
c′ = originS,t(c) and k′ = k−|S ∩ {v}|. The set Ŝ \{v} is (S \{v}, t′, c′, k′)-characterized.
Hence (c′, k′) ∈ CS\{v},t′ .
From these observations, the following equation follows for every S ⊆ χ(t):
CS,t = {(c⊕S,t v, k + |S ∩ {v}|) | (c, k) ∈ CS\{v},t′}
Forget node. Let t be a forget node with child t′ and let v be the unique element of χ(t′)\χ(t).
For each S ⊆ χ(t) and each function c ∈ FS∪{v}, we define a function c	∈S,t v, and for
each S ⊆ χ(t) and each function c ∈ FS , we define a function c 	/∈S,t v. Each of these
functions maps every subset of S to an integer.
(c	∈S,t v)(X) = min{c(X), c(X ∪ {v})}
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(c	/∈S,t v)(X) = c(X)
Next we define functions origin∈S,t and origin/∈S,t that map each element of FS to a set of
elements of FS∪{v} and FS , respectively:
origin∈S,t(c) = {c′ ∈ FS∪{v} | c = c′ 	∈S,t v}
origin/∈S,t(c) = {c′ ∈ FS | c = c′ 	/∈S,t v}
The following statements can be proved by arguments similar to those in Section 4.2:
Let Ŝ ⊆ V (G)t′ , S = Ŝ ∩ χ(t′) and (c, k) ∈ CS,t′ such that Ŝ is (S, t′, c, k)-characterized.
If v ∈ Ŝ, then Ŝ is (S \ {v}, t, c 	∈S,t v, k)-characterized and (c 	∈S,t v, k) ∈ CS\{v},t;
otherwise Ŝ is (S, t, c 	/∈S,t v, k)-characterized and (c 	/∈S,t v, k) ∈ CS,t. Conversely, let
Ŝ ⊆ V (G)t, S = Ŝ ∩ χ(t) and (c, k) ∈ CS,t such that Ŝ is (S, t, c, k)-characterized. If
v ∈ Ŝ, then there is some c′ ∈ origin∈S,t(c) such that Ŝ is (S ∪ {v}, t′, c′, k)-characterized
and (c′, k) ∈ CS∪{v},t′ ; otherwise there is some c′ ∈ origin/∈S,t(c) such that Ŝ is (S, t′, c′, k)-
characterized and (c′, k) ∈ CS,t′ .
From these observations, the following equation follows for every S ⊆ χ(t):
CS,t = {(c	∈S,t v, k) | (c, k) ∈ CS∪{v},t′} ∪ {(c	/∈S,t v, k) | (c, k) ∈ CS,t′}
Join node. Let t be a join node with children t′, t′′ such that χ(t) = χ(t′) = χ(t′′). For each
S ⊆ χ(t), and each c′, c′′ ∈ FS , we define a function c′ ⊗S,t c′′, which maps each subset of
S to an integer.
(c′ ⊗S,t c′′)(X) = c′(X) + c′′(X)− lscoreS,t(X)
Next we define a function originS,t that maps each element of FS to a subset of FS × FS :
originS,t(c) = {(c′, c′′) ∈ FS × FS | c = c′ ⊗S,t c′′}
The following statements can be proved by arguments similar to those in Section 4.2:
Let Ŝ′ ⊆ V (G)t′ , Ŝ′′ ⊆ V (G)t′′ , S = Ŝ′ ∩ Ŝ′′, (c′, k′) ∈ CS,t′ and (c′′, k′′) ∈ CS,t′′
such that Ŝ′ is (S, t′, c′, k′)-characterized and Ŝ′′ is (S, t′′, c′′, k′′)-characterized, and let
c = c′ ⊗S,t c′′ and k = k′ + k′′ − |S|. The set Ŝ′ ∪ Ŝ′′ is (S, t, c, k)-characterized and
(c, k) ∈ CS,t. Conversely, let Ŝ ⊆ V (G)t, S = Ŝ ∩ χ(t) and (c, k) ∈ CS,t such that Ŝ is
(S, t, c, k)-characterized. There is some (c′, c′′) ∈ originS,t(c) as well as integers k′, k′′ such
that k = k′ + k′′ − |S|, the set Ŝ ∩ V (G)t′ is (S, t′, c′, k′)-characterized and Ŝ ∩ V (G)t′′ is
(S, t′′, c′′, k′′)-characterized. Hence (c′, k′) ∈ CS,t′ and (c′′, k′′) ∈ CS,t′′ .
From these observations, the following equation follows for every S ⊆ χ(t):
CS,t = {(c′ ⊗S,t c′′, k′ + k′′ − |S|) | (c′, k′) ∈ CS,t′ , (c′′, k′′) ∈ CS,t′′}
We can now traverse the tree decomposition T in a bottom-up way and at each node t of
T compute the set CS,t for each S ⊆ χ(t). Let n denote the number of vertices of G and
w denote the width of T . Every element of CS,t is a pair (c, k), where c is a function that
maps each subset of S to an integer between −n and n, there are at most 2w subsets of S,
and k is an integer between 0 and n. Hence there are at most (2n+ 1)2w · (n+ 1) elements
of CS,t. Each individual element of CS,t can be computed in time O(2w). Finally, there are
at most 2w possible values for S and O(wn) many nodes in T . We thus get an algorithm
that takes as input an integer k together with a graph G whose treewidth we denote by w,
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and determines in time f(w) · ng(w) whether G admits a secure set of size k, where f and g
are functions that only depend on w.
This algorithm for Exact Secure Set obviously also gives us an algorithm for Secure
Set by checking all solution sizes from 1 to k. Finally, we can easily extend it to accommodate
complementary vertex pairs as well as necessary and forbidden vertices. Hence we get the
following XP membership result:
I Theorem 28. Secure Set, Exact Secure Set, Secure SetF, Exact Secure SetF,
Secure SetFN, Exact Secure SetFN, Secure SetFNC and Exact Secure SetFNC
can be solved in polynomial time if the treewidth of the input is bounded by a constant.
By keeping track of the origins of our computed values during our bottom-up traversal of
the tree decomposition, we can easily adapt the algorithm to find solutions if they exist.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we have solved a complexity problem in graph theory that, to the best of
our knowledge, has remained open since the introduction of secure sets [11] in 2007. We
have shown that the problem of deciding whether, for a given graph G and integer k, G
possesses a non-empty secure set of size at most k is ΣP2 -complete. We moreover obtained
ΣP2 -completeness for seven further variants of this problem.
In the second part of this paper, we analyzed the complexity of the Secure Set
problem parameterized by the treewidth of the input graph. In particular, we showed that
bounded treewidth does not make the problem fixed-parameter tractable unless FPT = W[1].
Nevertheless, we provided a polynomial-time algorithm for finding secure sets on graphs of
bounded treewidth and thus showed membership in the class XP. As a positive result, we
could show that the co-NP-complete problem of verifying whether a given set is secure can
be solved in fixed-parameter linear time when parameterized by treewidth.
There are several interesting directions for future research. One open question is which
additional restrictions beside bounded treewidth need to be imposed on Secure Set instances
to achieve fixed-parameter tractability. On the other hand, the Secure Set Verification
problem may remain FPT for parameters that are less restrictive than treewidth. We showed
W[1]-hardness and XP-membership of Secure Set, so a tight bound is still lacking, albeit
perhaps more of theoretical interest due to the fact that problems at a certain level of the
weft hierarchy generally do not admit faster algorithms than problems at higher levels. To
classify a problem as FPT w.r.t. treewidth, a common approach is to express it in monadic
second-order logic (MSO) and then invoke Courcelle’s Theorem [12], which immediately
proves that the problem is FPT. We showed that Secure Set Verification is FPT, but
it is not clear if it can be expressed in MSO. If it cannot, then our FPT result could hint
at possible extensions of MSO whose model-checking problem is still FPT. Similarly, we
believe that MSO can be extended in such a way that Secure Set can be expressed and
that a variant of Courcelle’s Theorem for showing membership in XP instead of FPT holds.
Finally, some of our results seem to be transferable to (variants of) the Defensive Alliance
problem, so it would be interesting to investigate if some of our reductions and algorithms
can help in the study of such related problems.
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